The Influence of Education and Socialization on Radicalization: An Exploration of Theoretical Presumptions and Empirical Research by Pels, Trees & de Ruyter, Doret J.
ORIGINAL PAPER
The Inﬂuence of Education and Socialization
on Radicalization: An Exploration of Theoretical
Presumptions and Empirical Research
Trees Pels • Doret J. de Ruyter
Published online: 24 November 2011
  The Author(s) 2011. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract
Background and Objective Research into radicalization does not pay much attention to
education. This is remarkable and possibly misses an important inﬂuence on the process of
radicalization. Therefore this article sets out to explore the relation between education on
the one hand and the onset or prevention of radicalization on the other hand.
Method This article is a theoretical literature review. It has analyzed empirical studies—
mainly from European countries—about the educational aims, content and style of Muslim
parents and parents with (extreme) right-wing sympathies.
Results Research examining similarity in right-wing sympathies between parents and
children yields mixed results, but studies among adolescents point to a signiﬁcant con-
cordance. Research also showed that authoritarian parenting may play a signiﬁcant role.
Similar research among Muslim families was not found. While raising children with
distrust and an authoritarian style are prevalent, the impact on adolescents has not been
investigated. The empirical literature we reviewed does not give sufﬁcient evidence to
conclude that democratic ideal in and an authoritative style of education are conducive to
the development of a democratic attitude.
Conclusion There is a knowledge gap with regard to the inﬂuence of education on the
onset or the prevention of radicalization. Schools and families are underappreciated
sources of informal social control and social capital and therefore the gap should be closed.
If there is a better understanding of the effect of education, policy as well as interventions
can be developed to assist parents and teachers in preventing radicalization.
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In the Netherlands, the debate about immigration and integration has hardened over the
years, even more so than in other European countries. Much of the debate focuses on
Muslim minorities, who are perceived as a single group despite their highly diverse ethnic
background. The building of mosques, the use of religious symbols such as the headscarf,
gender inequality, anti-integration pronouncements by ultra-orthodox imams, and Islam-
inspired political extremism are all popular subjects in the media (e.g. Uitermark et al.
2005). In addition to a change in views about Islam in the Western world, an impetus for
the negative climate was the brutal murder of ﬁlm director and media personality Theo van
Gogh by Mohammed B., son of Moroccan migrants in November 2004 (see Buruma 2006).
During the ﬁrst months after the murder, radicalized youngsters made the headlines of the
(internet) press on an almost daily basis. Since then, attention to Muslim terrorism has
steadily declined. This does not mean, however, that the threat of radicalization amongst
Muslim youngsters has diminished or that the soil for terrorism has become less fertile, for
a negative attitude against Islam is still highly prevalent.
The openly Islamophobic Freedom Party of Geert Wilders had a landslide victory in the
2010 elections, becoming the third largest party. A trend study about polarization and
radicalization in 2009 also concludes that there is a growing number of interethnic con-
frontations and an increase in tensions and confrontations with an Islamophobic nature.
Indigenous youngsters tend to think more negatively about their immigrant peers than vice
versa. This is not only true for extreme right youths, but also for the ‘average’ Dutch
youngsters (Moors et al. 2009). Although the majority of citizens believe that polarization
is a bigger problem than radicalization, they do relate the increase in opposing positions to
immigrants, Muslims especially (Moors et al. 2009). It is clear that in this environment the
relation of Muslim youngsters to the Dutch society is under pressure (e.g. Pels 2003); what
is more, these developments can contribute to an increased attachment of youngsters to
Islam. A research of Entzinger and Dourleijn (2008) in Rotterdam for instance shows that
amongst Moroccan youngsters, scoring lowest on the ethnic hierarchy in the Netherlands
(Hagendoorn 2007) and feeling more often rejected than other migrant groups (Moors et al.
2009), the number of practicing Muslims increases. A growing number is willing to
participate in legal activities like demonstrations to show their aggravation. Many
youngsters experience a ‘wall of distrust’, which for some of them means that they no
longer take an interest in their environment and its rules and eventually live up to the
negative expectations that others have against them (see also Harris 1995).
The upraise of the populist parties with right-wing populist political messages may not
only be a risk for the radicalization of Muslim youngsters, but may also infuse right-wing
extremism, because right-wing convictions are openly preached. The fact that right-wing
views are no longer politically incorrect may be a stepping stone to extremist views.
Although the future may also show that the increasing political power of people with these
convictions reduces the likelihood that they will become extremists, the current Dutch
society seems to face a looming danger on two sides. Moreover, it is well possible that the
growth of right-wing extremism and Islamic radicalism reinforce each other.
Thus, we suggest that research into prevention of radicalization is still imperative, but
more importantly, we want to argue that it requires an additional focus, namely on the
socialization and educational environments within which children and youngsters develop.
While there is a growing research interest into the socio-psychological antecedents of
radicalization (e.g. Moghaddam 2005; Van den Bos et al. 2009), there is not much insight
into the relation between socialization, education and radicalization. Available facts,
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Radicalization is more prevalent amongst adolescents and young adults (15–30 years) and
trends show that youngsters radicalize at a younger age (Buijs et al. 2006; Sageman 2008;
Slootman and Tillie 2006).
1 Moreover, the developmental tasks of adolescents—among
which are developing a personal, social and political identity, redeﬁning bonds and rela-
tions and forming new relationships—make them vulnerable to radical beliefs. This is
particularly the case when for instance (perceived) exclusion and personal or group threat,
being uprooted and/or an experienced gap with the adult world lie at the root of this
vulnerability (Buijs et al. 2006; Moghaddam 2005). A vigilant attitude by institutions
responsible for children’s socialization and education, especially families and schools,
toward nascent radicalization seems to be in place (e.g. Hagan et al. 1995).
After a brief elucidation of the terms radicalization and extremism, we describe our
theoretical presumptions with regard to the relation between two central aspects of par-
enting and school education on the one hand and radicalization on the other hand. Next, we
present insights from an analysis of existing empirical research, for which we mainly draw
from three European countries in which upbringing in Muslim families and by parents with
right-wing sympathies have been investigated most extensively. However, although the
research is drawn from these countries, our claim that research about radicalization needs
to include the education and socialization of youngsters, is not speciﬁc to those countries.
Moreover, we suggest that researchers in all Western societies should investigate important
educational inﬂuences on phenomena of polarization and radicalization, also in order to
enable the development of preventive measures. For this reason, this article addresses an
international audience. In addition to a call for further research, our article ends with the
suggestion that assistance to parents and schools that diminishes the development of
radicalization has to be developed.
Radicalism and Extremism
‘Radical’ does not necessarily have a negative meaning. As the dictionary teaches us, the
ﬁrst, and non-pejorative meaning of being radical is ‘Arising from or going to a root or to
the basis’. An example of a radical person, in this sense of the word, is someone who wants
to change the domination and pollution of the consumer market and advocates that all
consumer products of multi-nationals be banned and that only local produce should be
sold. This is, however, not the dominant meaning, which is ‘departing markedly from the
existing or being extreme’. Although close to our example, this meaning has a negative
connotation, which is related to the phrase ‘being extreme’. In this deﬁnition, the differ-
ence between radicalism and extremism seems to evaporate. This has actually happened in
our common language. Both concepts are being used for the same type of conviction and
disposition, at least for radicalism in the negative sense—and this has become the domi-
nant conception of radicalism (Mandel in press).
However, although the terms are used for the same type of convictions and dispositions,
they tend to refer to different groups. While academic literature on extremism in recent
years also covers radicalized Muslims, ‘extremism’ tends to represent political and par-
ticularly right-wing political viewpoints. ‘Radicalism’ on the other hand almost exclusively
1 Sageman (2008), for instance, shows that in consecutive waves of terrorism, the age of Islamic terrorists
has declined since the ‘80s, from an average of thirty to early twenty. It is, however, not only prevalent in
adolescence; older persons are involved in (planned) attacks too.
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spread their beliefs or found their utopian state (see for instance Schmid and Price 2011). It
should also be noted that in current academic and popular literature the difference between
radicalism and terrorism has become a very thin line. Much literature on radicalization
deals with terrorism (see Schmid and Price 2011). We do not equate radicalization with
terrorism. While some radicalized persons and right wing extremists may not shy away
from terrorist acts, others may use less extreme ways to impose their views on other
people. We follow Mandel (in press) who proposes as a working deﬁnition of radicali-
zation: ‘an increase in and/or reinforcing of extremism in the thinking, sentiments, and/or
behavior of individuals and/or groups of individuals’ (p. 20).
Research into right-wing and Muslim radicalism seems to indicate that there are similar
socialization and developmental patterns. For instance, in both cases feelings of unjust
treatment and of insecurity and perceived fraternal deprivation can lead to the development
of radical beliefs and acts (Reinares et al. 2008; Van den Bos et al. 2009). The Netherlands
can function as an example to illustrate this point.
We already noted in the introduction that the debate in the Netherlands about Islam and
Muslims has become quite extreme. Proposals by Wilders’ Party for Freedom to put a tax
on the wearing of scarves (which he malignly calls the head rag tax) or Wilders’ reference
to Muslim voters as ‘voting cattle’ are telling examples. In such a hostile environment we
may expect a rise in feelings of relative deprivation,
2 (perceived) injustice and group threat
(e.g. Moghaddam 2005; Silke 2008; Van den Bos et al. 2009), which can lead to feelings of
uncertainty (e.g. Hogg 2004; Moghaddam 2005). This, in turn can motivate people to
ﬁnding other securities, and the clear rules and distinct groups of radicalized peers are then
attractive alternatives. Various empirical studies indeed show that there is a relation
between real and perceived deprivation, feelings of powerlessness and low self-esteem on
the one hand and radicalization on the other hand (Buijs et al. 2006; Kuhn 2004).
Young Muslims in the Netherlands have a high risk to experience these threats to their
‘self’. In addition to their (perceived) exclusion for being a migrant or Muslim adverse
living conditions may also take their toll. The majority grows up in ethnically diverse
neighborhoods in which there is an accumulation of problems: poverty, school failure,
health and behavioral problems, unemployment, disruptive behavior and criminality (e.g.
Pels et al. 2009). These circumstances also inﬂuence parental upbringing, because parents
have fewer social sources available. Moreover, possibilities for collective socialization in
the neighborhood are being challenged (for instance Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn 2000).
For native youngsters who feel or are deprived of opportunities, the strong and relatively
simple right-wing message that particular groups are to blame, may be highly appealing. In
the Netherlands, native youth in rural areas clash with immigrant youth out of frustration
about (perceived) negative interethnic relations, interethnic competition and the loss of
their ‘imagined community’ due to the rapid inﬂux of migrants during the past decennia
(Cadat and Engbersen 2006; Van der Valk and Wagenaar 2010).
Researchers, however, also agree that radicals, extremists, and terrorists have different
backgrounds and that there is not a speciﬁc or special factor that all persons share in their
personality or history (see for instance Silke 2008), although some do suggest that there are
2 Relative deprivation is a form of (perceived) discrimination resulting from social comparison. This could
be a realistic or real type of discrimination for instance in politics or economic circumstances, and a
symbolic type of discrimination through stigmatization or negative stereotyping (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner,
2006). The last type is also called interactional and procedural (in)justice, i.e. perceived deprivation in
interpersonal interaction and institutional approach. (Perceived) deprivation is possible at both an individual
and a collective level.
314 Child Youth Care Forum (2012) 41:311–325
123general phases or steps in the process of radicalization (Bandura 2004; Moghaddam 2005;
Porter and Kebbell 2011). When researchers investigate determinants (see for an overview
Silke 2008), they tend to look at characteristics of the individual (biological, psycholog-
ical), at environment or context, and at interactions between these two. Reinares et al.
(2008), for instance, state that the commonality between all forms of radicalization leading
towards violence is
that it always takes place at the intersection of an enabling environment and a
personal trajectory. Not all individuals who share the same sense of injustice or are
living in the same polarized environment turn to radicalism and even less to violence
and terrorism. Concrete personal experiences, kinship and friendship, group
dynamics and socialization into the use of violence are needed to trigger the actual
process. (p. 9).
We want to add that parents and teachers are well placed to inﬂuence children and
youngsters, both towards radicalization as well as to the prevention of this process.
Theoretical Premises About the Inﬂuence of Education
Empirical research has indicated that the level of education of radicalized youngsters and
adults does not have a strong inﬂuence on (prevention) of radicalization (see for instance
Silke 2008). Among radicalized persons, one can ﬁnd well-educated persons as well as
those without a diploma. It may therefore not come as a surprise that in the U.S. for
instance, where radicalization and particularly terrorism receive a lot of scientiﬁc and
political attention, education is hardly included in an attempt to counter radicalization (see
Webber 2011). However, the education youngsters receive from their parents and in
schools includes much more than academic level.
We believe that it is important to pay attention to two aspects of education in families
and schools, namely the content of the education youngsters receive as well as the style
with which parents and teachers raise and educate children and youngsters. For both
aspects, we formulate a positive and negative premise.
1. The content (aims and ideals) of the upbringing and education of parents and teachers
(a) It is theoretically plausible to presume that parents and teachers who have
radicalized or extremist convictions aim to transmit these ideals and values to the
children they are responsible for. For, if one is convinced of the (moral or
religious) truth of one’s ideals and values, one will want to ensure that children
will also be as strongly convinced. All fundamentalist, radicalized and extremist
educators share the propensity to indoctrinate. Whether or not they are successful
is obviously a different matter. However, we may assume that children will be
inﬂuenced by the ideal-driven education they receive and that there is a
likelihood that children come to adopt these ideals.
(b) In contrast, it is reasonable to assume that youngsters will adopt democratic
ideals if they are fostered by educators. Since Dewey (1903), many education-
alists have suggested that the development of children into democratic citizens is
furthered if they are raised in democratic schools. If parents and teachers aim to
educate children towards democratic citizens who have respect for the rights of
others and to tolerate beliefs, religious or otherwise, that are different from their
own (see for instance Davies 2009; Webber 2011), the education that children
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and extremism.
More particularly, we may assume on theoretical grounds that moral education
can prevent radicalization. Extremists perform activities that they possibly had
never thought they would be capable of. Bandura (2002, 2004) suggests that
moral disengagement might play an important role in this process. Under the
umbrella of disengagement, he describes several mechanisms, such as redeﬁning
harmful conduct by moral justiﬁcation, euphemistic labeling of acts, minimizing
or misconstruing the consequences, dehumanization of the other or attribution of
blame on the victim. Democratic moral education may have an important role in
adequately responding to signs of moral distancing.
2. The style of parenting or teaching
(a) The authoritarian style of education is characterized by demanding strict
obedience and by a lack of explanation or justiﬁcation of the rules children and
youngsters are expected to follow (see Baumrind 1966). Such a style will not
contribute to the development of critical thinking and negotiation and therefore
does not diminish the chance of radicalization. Equally, lack of openness to
discuss views does not further the openness to others.
(b) It seems reasonable to assume that there is a positive relation between an
authoritative educational style and democratic attitude of children—which may
have a preventive inﬂuence on the development of radicalization. If parents are
open to a discussion with their children, if they give their reasons for their beliefs
and decisions and if they allow children to negotiate (which does not mean that
children have a say in everything), they further a democratic attitude in their
children. For instance, authoritative Muslim parents may be able to enhance the
development of what is called ‘polder Islam’: a type of faith that corresponds
with the discussion and coalition culture in the Netherlands (Buitelaar 2009).
Equally, we suggest that there are good reasons to presume that inclusive
approaches in multi-ethnic schools, like creating a sense of community through
cooperative learning and developing democratic and justice-oriented communi-
ties (e.g. Hansen 2001; Westheimer and Kahne 2004), instead of accentuating
assimilation and control, has a diminishing effect on the onset of radicalization.
Of course, the style of education in itself is not sufﬁcient but should be
complemented with an appropriate content. It is, for instance, possible that
parents with an authoritative parenting style have racist ideals or believe that
their ethnic or religious identity is being threatened, which they also pass onto
their children. It is therefore important to make a clear distinction between
educational aims or ideals on the one hand and the style of education on the other
hand.
Methods
We have analyzed theoretical and empirical studies about upbringing in Muslim families
and the content and style of education of parents with (extreme) right-wing sympathies in
relation to radicalization of their adolescent children. As mentioned, there is hardly any
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case of Muslim youngsters, and therefore we also use more general empirical research about
these youngsters and those with latent right-wing sympathies to see if they are socialized in
an environment that makes them more or less prone to radicalize. Empirical studies about
Muslim families were mainly drawn from the Netherlands where a lot of empirical research
has been conducted with regard to the socialization and educational situation of Muslim
youngsters. Thus, insights from research within the Dutch context, which has speciﬁc
challenges for both categories of youngsters, will be used as prime examples of existent
knowledge. Empirical research into the socialization history of youth with right-wing
sympathies is scarce in the Netherlands. Therefore, our main sources of information about
this group will be from other countries, Germany and Belgium in particular.
Results
Families and Parental Education
Research of Zenter and Renaud (2007) that speciﬁcally looked at the similarity of ideals
within families shows that the similarity is mainly due to the culture of the environment in
which the family lives. After correcting for cultural factors, the similarity between the ideal
selves of parents and children is low, due to what they call a telephone game effect.
… the message [ideals of the parents, inserted by authors] is altered because not
everything that parents wish for themselves do they also wish for their children.
Subsequently, the message is altered again because the latter perceive what parents
wish for their children with imperfect accuracy. A ﬁnal transmutation of the message
occurs because parental ideals, even if accurately perceived, are not always accepted
by the child. (p. 569)
However, this is possibly different for the two groups we are interested in. Parents with
right-wing extremist sympathies and Muslim parents may have a stronger wish to pass on
their ideals and values to their children, particularly because their views differ from those
of the mainstream culture. Indeed, research of Boehnke et al. (2007) showed that the
distance of the family from what they call Zeitgeist affects intra-familial value similarity. It
can also be suggested that if the family culture differs from the mainstream culture, which
is the case in the majority of Muslim migrant families and of right wing native families,
intergenerational similarity of ideals and values can be attributed to the inﬂuence of
parents. Vedder et al. (2008) for instance found that in immigrant groups the ethnic
Zeitgeist played a signiﬁcant role in adolescents’ acceptance of family obligations.
Empirical research that particularly focuses on the inﬂuence of parental ideals and aims
on the onset of radicalization of Muslim youngsters is, however, not prevalent. A source
that might be helpful is that on ethnic socialization. Anglo-Saxon literature mentions
different strategies of ethnic (or racial) socialization in the family (e.g. Hughes et al. 2006),
with two poles that can concisely be described as follows: parents can use more open or
‘dual’ parenting strategies, in which ethno-cultural loyalty coincides with openness
towards the ‘other’ (e.g. Lafromboise et al. 1993), or more defensive or antagonistic coping
styles that may inculcate an attitude of distrust in their children and may make them more
prone to conﬂict vis-a `-vis the ‘other’. The latter may possibly inﬂuence the onset of
radicalization. Qualitative research on parenting in Dutch minority families points to more
or less defensive or antagonistic attitudes vis-a `-vis society at large. Particularly Muslim
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et al. 2009), but there is insufﬁcient knowledge about the inﬂuence of this distrust on
youngsters. Nor do we know how parents respond to children who are under the inﬂuence
of radical Islamists, or how radicalization inﬂuences family relations.
In contrast, there is empirical research about the similarity of right-wing convictions
between parents and children. Research examining similarity in xenophobia between
parents and pre-adolescent children yields mixed results, but studies among adolescents
point to a signiﬁcant concordance (Gniewosz and Noack 2006). Duriez, Soenens and
Vansteenkiste (2007) discovered that parental goals do predict Right-Wing Authoritari-
anism and Social Dominance Orientation and Duriez and Soenens’ research (2009) cor-
roborated the conclusion of a few studies among adolescents that there is a signiﬁcant
concordance in racism between parents and their adolescent children, which in their study
was found to result largely ‘‘from a more fundamental intergenerational transmission of
ideology’’ (p. 906). German studies examining anti-foreigner and national-authoritarian
attitudes also found similarities between parents and their adolescent children (Kracke
et al. 1993; Noack and Kracke 2000), indicating processes of role modeling in the area of
right wing extremism. Whether or not this is true for migrant families whose culture also
differs from the mainstream culture is an important empirical question.
Thereisalsoempiricalresearchavailableabouttheinﬂuenceofparentingstylesandright-
wing extremism in youngsters. Higherscores of adolescents on xenophobia, asone indicator
of right-wing extremism, were found in families characterized by lower emotional related-
ness (Kracke et al. 1993). A more punitive and authoritarian-rigid parenting style has been
associatedwithmoreright-wingattitudes(Fend1991),morexenophobia(Heﬂeretal.1999),
and strongerauthoritarian characteristics (Rebenstorfet al.2000) inadolescents.Altogether,
we conclude that, besides the direct inﬂuences of parents as role-models, parental style as
indicatedbypooremotionalrelationshipsandcommunicationandbyauthoritarianparenting
may play a signiﬁcant role in the socialization of deviant political behavior.
There is no similar empirical research available with regard to the relation between
radicalization amongst Muslim youngsters and the parenting style of parents. However,
empirical research does show that the parenting style of Muslim parents may not have an
inhibiting effect on radicalization. Muslim parents in the Netherlands rank conformity and
moral obeisance higher and autonomy lower as parental goals compared to native Dutch
parents, though much of this difference diminishes when educational level is taken into
account (Pels and De Haan 2007; Pels et al. 2006). Qualitative data, however, point to
differences in meaning attached to the same goals. The Muslim parents interpret autonomy
in a less individualistic sense and conformity in a less egalitarian sense than Dutch parents.
The differences regarding parental goals are reﬂected in parents’ educational style.
Authoritative control is fairly common within Dutch families, whereas restrictive control is
more salient within minority families, who use both types of controlling techniques to about
thesameextent.Maintainingauthorityandcommunicationwiththeirchildren inaculture of
egalitarian social interaction is perceived by them as a more difﬁcult task (Pels et al. 2006).
Youngsters in these circles also perceive a lack of open communication with their
parents (e.g. Pels 2003; Pels et al. 2008). This lack of openness may have various con-
sequences. Firstly, it has been shown that in general children risk being marginalized when
they are raised in a ‘cold family’ in which there are also conﬂicts about authority (e.g.
Patterson and Yoerger 2002; Pels 2003; Stevens et al. 2007). Young Muslims tend to
receive less parental support than indigenous Dutch youngsters do. Particularly their
fathers tend to be much less involved (Pels et al. 2006). Research amongst Moroccan
families shows that this is particularly true for boys: they cannot turn to their parents as
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Pels and De Haan 2007; Stevens et al. 2004). Girls are educated in a stricter way; for them
Islam can be a way to strive for autonomy and freedom (Pels et al. 2009).
Schools and Schooling
Schools are in principle a good place for youngsters from different ethnic backgrounds to
bridge the ethnic boundaries. Schools are one of the contexts where peers meet, informally
but also in task-oriented settings. Schools may bring pupils together who may have not
otherwise developed relationships. Furthermore, these groups can provide the social skills
that may enhance other relationships (O’Koon 1997). Research, however, indicates that we
should not be too optimistic in our expectations. Interethnic contacts in schools do not
signiﬁcantly increase (Bakker et al. 2007). Moreover, youngsters tend to withdraw into
their own ethnic groups outside the school context (Interculturele verhoudingen op
Amsterdamse scholen, 2005). In general, research on the ‘contact-hypothesis’ (increased
interethnic contact leads to a decrease of prejudice and an increase of interaction across
ethnic borders) shows that this hypothesis is not corroborated on a wide scale. Contact
leads to positive interactions only in speciﬁc contexts, for instance if groups are equal in
their position on the status hierarchy (Lindo 2008).
We have not found empirical research that focuses on the similarity between radical
ideals and values of teachers and pupils. Empirical research into the inﬂuence of democratic
ideals and moral values of teachers and schools on pupils and thereby the decrease of
radicalization is similarly hard to ﬁnd. There is some evidence that teachers’ interventions
with xenophobic utterances of pupils are negatively related to xenophobia of pupils (Bacher
2001). In other words, intervening matters. However, not all teachers seem to have great
interestinthesocializationoftheirpupilsinthissense.AsPels(2011)concludesonthebasis
of a review of Dutch literature, a crystallized view on dealing with diversity on a religious,
cultural or ethnic basis, or with tensions on these issues is still farfetched. Research of the
city of Amsterdam (Gemeente Amsterdam 2005) among 25 schools for secondary education
points to an increase in incidents between groups of pupils as well as between minority
pupils and teachers. Teachers interviewed by Leeman (2003) report problems with teaching
on politically laden subjects as the Middle East, terrorist attacks or religion.
Not only the content of education is of importance, but also teaching competence and
style. Leeman (2003) found that teachers are at a loss ﬁnding ways to handle difﬁcult
discussions in which respect and consensus are difﬁcult to reach. In order to ensure that
lessons can continue orderly and to maintain a relatively peaceful atmosphere in the class,
teacherstend toavoidtopicsthattouch onreligiousand ethnic-cultural diversity.Apart from
the fact that teachers may lack competencies to effectively cope with tensions in the
classroom, they may apply a more or less authoritarian style of approaching their pupils. As
we argued, their educational style can also have a positive or negative inﬂuence on radi-
calization, just as we discussed for parents. Interestingly, schools that provide vocational
education—where minority pupils are overrepresented—tend to prefer authoritarian edu-
cationinsteadofinteractiveorparticipativeeducation(Mooren2006;Onstenk2006).Again,
this doesnot seemto be aneffective style fordeveloping democratic dispositionsand acting.
Research in Amsterdam (Gemeente Amsterdam 2005) shows that generally the com-
mitment or loyalty of minority children to their school is greater if there is more individual
attention for students. This last ﬁnding is corroborated in other research: young Muslims
mention the important support they felt from a single teacher who did take notice and
interest (Pels 2008; Pels et al. 2009). This is an important fact, because youngsters who are
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tionships (Buijs et al. 2006). The literature, however, also mentions more or less conscious
exclusion of pupils by teachers. Observation research shows that some teachers discern
‘we’ from ‘you’ ‘us from ‘them’ when addressing migrant pupils or their communities of
descent (Duits 2008). Ascribing representations and identities to students, or discounting
their deviating views as ‘exceptions’ is not uncommon (Koole and Hanson 2002). The
negative inﬂuence of discrimination and different treatment of children from minority
groups on their well-being at school or college, motivation and achievements is broadly
documented (e.g. De Graaf et al. 2006; Dilworth and Brown 2001; Severiens et al. 2008;
Wubbels et al. 2006).
Since (perceived) deprivation is one of the major root causes for radicalization, we may
conclude that current practices in schooling often do not seem apt to diminish the sus-
ceptibility to radicalization in youngsters. Citizenship education might be one of the
answers. In response to threats to democracy by a violent political Islam and extremism
from the right, and the resulting social instability and feelings of insecurity, many western
countries have welcomed citizenship to their political and educational agenda (Brubaker
2001). However, in many Dutch schools citizenship education is taking a one-sided turn,
accentuating individual rights and (moral) obligations and focusing on students of non-
western descent to assimilate. It does not stimulate teachers and students to take a reﬂective
stance on inequalities and cultural pluralism in society (Leeman and Pels 2006).
Finally, it may not only be the education within families or schools in itself that has an
inﬂuence on the onset of radicalization, it is also possible that a lack of a good functioning
(inter ethnic) civil society is an obstacle. We may presume that interaction and preferably
co-operation between families and schools will have a diminishing effect on radicalization.
Particularly for youngsters who are vulnerable due to perceived discrimination and
injustice in society and who are searching for an authority ﬁgure, the cooperation between
these socializing institutions might be crucial. Recently, there is a growing interest in
collective socialization, which is an active engagement between and cooperation of
informal and formal educators in the community. Examples are a communal formulation of
rules (intergenerational closure), exchange of information and advice and informal social
control and support. These forms of social capital are not self-evident, on the contrary, one
of the undermining factors is the presence of an ethnic heterogeneous population—and
concomitant language, social and cultural hurdles (Sampson et al. 1999).
Available Dutch research shows that the two educational domains we have highlighted
are often separate islands that are unable to realize sufﬁcient bridging. In practice coop-
eration between parents and schools often plods along heavily (Pels 2011). On the contrary,
both parties may even hinder or undermine each other’s intentions. For example, research in
Amsterdam schools showed that parents and schools differed in the messages they provided
about the murder of Theo van Gogh (Visser and Slot 2005) and another study among
Amsterdam schools showed that a wider gap between migrant parents and the school
increases the distance between migrant and native youngsters (Interculturele verhoudingen
2005). This could lead to an educational vacuum of which the signs are visible in the public
domain in which groups of youngsters take a lead in their own socialization (Pels 2003).
In conclusion
Research on radicalization tends to focus on adolescents, because it is likely that radi-
calization ﬁnds its roots in this developmental stage. There is a growing research interest
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123into the socio-psychological antecedents of radicalization. An interesting use of general
psychological insights into the reduction of extremist views can be found in Lilienfeld
et al. (2009), who plea for extending research into debiasing interventions. They translate
the results of the psychological research on biases in general into proposals for debiasing
adults and children who have radicalized views. These include psychoeducational methods
to combat ‘conﬁrmation bias’ pivotal to ideological extremism and inter- and intra-group
conﬂict. Education about speciﬁc cognitive biases, perspective taking, active open-mind-
edness and delayed decision making are among the methods that might be of use.
Research into parental upbringing and education in schools is far from complete. We
stated that it is plausible to assume a relation between the ideals of education on the one
hand and the onset or prevention of radicalization on the other hand. The intergenerational
transmission of ideology, so we argued, may be profound in the context of migration,
inducing more intensiﬁed communication about ethnic-cultural or religious differences.
There is empirical research that showed a relation between extreme right-wing convictions
of parents and those of their children. It is important that this research be expanded and
also includes Muslim families, for ideological transmission has not been researched within
these families. In addition, we claimed to have good reasons for believing that the style of
education has a positive or negative inﬂuence on the onset of radicalization. More par-
ticularly, we presupposed that an authoritative style of education is conducive to the
development of a democratic attitude—provided it is complemented with the appropriate
democratic content. The empirical literature we reviewed does not give us sufﬁcient evi-
dence to be able to conclude that this presumption is correct.
We also formulated the presumption that democratic ideals and moral education can
prevent radicalization, by adequately responding to signs of moral distancing and stimu-
lating adherence to moral rules and respect for the liberal moral rights of others. The
available literature again does not offer much information on these issues. However, we
did ﬁnd that minority and native parents as well as and teachers struggle with their
educational tasks in the multi-ethnic context, especially with respect to the tensions,
conﬂicts and discrimination that may arise in this context.
We believe it is of eminent importance that the knowledge gap in this ﬁeld be closed.
Firstly, particular attention should be given to the way in which parents pass on ideas and
evaluations about society, which difﬁculties parents experience when their youngsters
come under the inﬂuence of radical peers or organizations, which inﬂuence this has on
family life and how parents can be assisted. Secondly, it is important to investigate the
aims and content (and ideals) of education that parents and teachers provide as well as the
inﬂuence of these aims and content on the development of a democratic disposition or
radicalization of youngsters. If we have a better understanding of these two issues, policy
can be developed to assist parents and teachers in educating youngsters, with a particular
view to prevent radicalization.
Thus, this knowledge is not only important for scientists, but may be helpful for
developing interventions that support parents and teachers (Weine et al. 2009). Schools and
families are underappreciated sources of informal social control and social capital that may
constrain Islamic radicalism and right-wing extremism. We believe that it is important that
not only speciﬁc programs are developed, but that general programs for parental support
and family interventions also enclose scientiﬁc knowledge about the speciﬁc difﬁculties
parents can face in a multi-ethnic context. Moreover, in current teacher education and
social work training-programs, little attention is given to the fact that a signiﬁcant number
of families come from other regions of the world, or face the challenge to raise their
children in a multi-ethnic context (e.g. Pels 2010). Parents and pupils can be more
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123successfully supported if social workers and teachers are sensitive to their needs, com-
mitted to giving them a voice and competent to deal with controversial issues (Davies
2009; Howard and Hodes 2000; Pels 2011). Such improvements are highly important, but
not sufﬁcient we should add. We do agree with De Winter (2006), who suggests that it is
unlikely that changing education of youngsters who are radicalizing is efﬁcient if
governments do not take sufﬁcient effort to change society into a truly democratic and
just one. Youngsters should experience that it is indeed in their favour to act and think
democratically. If there is no advantage for them, they might lose faith in democracy.
Thus, the state should not only stimulate democratic education, but also be a model to the
youngsters and aim to ensure that all citizens are able to make use of their democratic
rights and fulﬁl their democratic duties.
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